Iraq’s national election is set to take place on Nov. 11. While this is the sixth election in Iraq as of 2005, there are several key factors that distinguish this election cycle from the previous ones, impacting the nation’s political landscape for years to come.

The electoral system is being overseen by the Independent High Electoral Commission, an independent body responsible for ensuring the election process is conducted in line with Iraq’s constitution and laws. The election seeks to fill in 329 seats within Iraq’s Council of Representatives with more than 7,700 candidates currently running for office. The IHEC reports a total of 21,404,291 eligible voters. Official campaigning began more than a month ago on Oct. 3 and will continue until Nov. 8. Special voting, reserved for primarily members of the security forces, will take place two to three days before the election on the 11th.

In regards to Iraq’s electoral framework, the nation is unofficially ruled by a confessionalist system or muhasasa in Arabic, meaning that top offices and the general political sphere are divided based on an ethno-sectarian quota. Specifically, this has manifested historically in a Shia Prime Minister, a Sunni Speaker of Parliament, and a Kurdish President for the Kurdish region.

The current Prime Minister, Mohammed Shia al Sudani is campaigning for a second term in office. He is a part of the Coordination Framework, Iraq’s principal Shia political bloc, responsible for electing al Sudani as Prime Minister in 2022. Within the coalition are several of Iraq’s main Shia parties. However, a crucial factor for the Shia factions in the election is Muqtada al-Sadr, head of the National Shia Movement, who called on his supporters to boycott the parliamentary election due to al-Sadr's disapproval of muhasasa and what he claims to be a corrupt government. His bloc used to be the largest in parliament, totaling 73 seats in the 2021 early elections, yet in June 2022, he ordered his MP’s to resign after failing to form a national majority government. This boycott is widely considered a key reason for reduced voter turnout, especially among the Shia majority of the state.

Iraq’s Sunni minority does not have a single dominant representative. The Taqaddum (Progress) Party led by Mohammed al-Halbousi has decreased in momentum following his removal from office. Other candidates who are aiming to gain leadership among the Sunni population include Khamis al-Khanjar’s Sovereignty Alliance, Muthanna al-Samarrai’s Azm Alliance, and al-Hasm al-Watani led by Thabit Mohammed Saeed. Overall, Sunni voters are engaging more with the polls across multiple provinces this election, reflecting a modest resurgence in voter engagement.

The Kurdistan Region appears to be experiencing internal issues, leaving them politically divided and lessening their potential impact in the election. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s reputation has decreased due to leadership disputes, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s long-standing prominence in Kurdish politics is also experiencing increased opposition. Both parties are shifting their focus towards Baghdad to increase their impact on federal decision making. However, the Kurdistan Islamic Movement differs from these two leading parties and have called to boycott the elections.

In the Iraqi electoral system, the governorates operate on a modified Sainte-Laguë formula that uses a divisor of 1.7 rather than the standard 1. There are a few quotas in place, for example at least 25% of all parliamentary seats are required to be held by women. There are also 9 seats out of 329 reserved for minorities: 5 for Christians and one for Yazidi, Shabak, Mandaen, and Feyli Kurds.

As election day creeps in, campaign signs, posters, and banners have become an eyesore for the people of Iraq. The smiling (and heavily photoshopped) portraits of tens of politicians are featured throughout cities, covering walls, bridges, and even trees. According to the Green Iraq Observatory, approximately 250,000 trees have been damaged as a direct result of this campaign style, with some candidates resorting to cutting branches and drilling holes to hang their posters. While the Kurdistan Region has largely adhered to environmental regulations, many areas, such as (and especially) Baghdad, saw severe harm to public greenery. The widespread use of physical campaign materials has not only sparked frustration from the public due to its visual pollution, but has also taken a toll on the already degraded environment of Iraq.

Beyond the streets, the elections have taken over the airwaves. Television channels, social media platforms, and even local radio stations are flooded with campaign ads, interviews, and heated debates. Shafaq News, a local newspaper, stated that the digital sphere, largely unsupervised by the Electoral Commission, is reshaping the current elections and “has become a defining force in Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary elections, turning social media platforms into the primary stage for political competition.”. Digital campaigning has also been muddied by the use of “electronic armies,” coordinated online groups that are hired to smear or support certain candidates. Documents leaked in the past by Al Araby Al Jadeed indicate that disgraced former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was among the first to implement these armies in his campaigns in 2010 to 2012. While hiring electronic armies is standard online campaigning, it is also very expensive. Between July and September 2025, Iraqi political forces spent more than $1 million USD on paid ads on Facebook and Instagram, with approximately 60% of that money coming from pages with no declared political identity. On social media, however, many Iraqis appear to view the elections with skepticism. A widespread belief that electoral outcomes will bring little to no meaningful change has fueled a wave of satire online. Iraqis have circulated memes and parody videos, featuring Western musicians or controversial figures as mock candidates, while others have ridiculed campaigners or even registered to run as a form of protest, or perhaps humor.

These posts, often humorous, are cynical – a mechanism to cope in a country where corruption is rampant and faith in political institutions and the chance of reform has worn thin. What was once an aim at civic participation has become a disillusioned performance.