At a time when a locally manufactured vaccine promised to end a truly nightmarish, Covid-laden year for the Indian government, protests have erupted across the country in opposition to amendments and new laws that seek to reform the Indian agricultural sector. The protests, conducted multilaterally by 35 farmer unions, have disrupted supply chains, railway schedules and strategic partnerships at domestic and international levels.

The three laws under contention are The Farmers’ Produce Trade and Commerce (Promotion and Facilitation) Bill, The Farmers (Empowerment and Protection) Agreement of Price Assurance Bill and The Farm Services and the Essential Commodities (Amendment) Bill. The contention to these reforms is that they will remove protections in the agricultural industry which prevent private sector involvement and, worse yet, enable a private-sector induced exploitation of farmers.

The government, on the other hand, resolutely claims that these reforms will enable greater private sector investment in infrastructure building and the establishment of more robust national and international supply chains. Further, an influx of investment in farms may enable greater productivity through the introduction of newer technologies. The bills also allow farmers to sell outside their district markets, enabling them to sell at the highest market price across the country.

The argument for these reforms is an economically traditional one; greater private investment with self-interest will drive further growth in the industry and support the common good. Viewing the reforms in a vacuum, they seem imperative. To achieve a similar end, these reforms have been likened to the fabled New Industry Policy of 1991, a policy that truly disburdened a staggering Indian economy and set it up for tremendous strides, the fruits of which have set up a robust modern industry. These arguments seek to attract popular support for the policy, similar to the overwhelming support that the 1991 economic reforms received. However, this argument fails to consider the context of the situation. In 1991, the country was facing a balance of payments crisis and only held enough foreign exchange reserves to support three weeks of imports. Public sentiment and the agricultural sector of today are incomparable to 1991. Thus, these policies are bound to receive further criticism and opposition and it seems the government still struggles to understand this idea.

This obtuseness has festered into a staunch opposition to repealing the laws. Instead, the Home Minister proposed an amended bill to the 35 Farmer unions, which was promptly rejected. In response to the agitation, the Shiromani Akali Dal or SAD, has left the Bharatiya Janata Party’s ruling alliance over the promulgation of these laws. The SAD is a farmer oriented party hailing from Punjab, and while its departure does not endanger the government’s majority, the move is significant as the SAD was the BJP’s oldest ally. It shows us the lengths to which the BJP is ready to go to in order to achieve a rather unilateral aim.

The reforms truly disrupt the status quo of current agricultural procurement practices. Such reform demands debate, negotiation and due procedure, none of which were truly conducted by the government. The bills were not sent through appropriate channels of discussion, such as parliamentary committees. Instead, there was a direct discussion in the Lok Sabha, the House of the People. At no point before the Lok Sabha were the bills given multilateral consideration. Without any debate over such a contentious topic, such opposition and protests are expected. Yes, a conventional route may have taken more time, but it is now when such a system shows its merit. It enables negotiations to take place under situations without the repercussions we see now. Experts and parties can voice the opinions of their millions of constituents before achieving a negotiated agreement. Such a process may water-down a bill, it may make reforms less effective in the short-term, but it does create a base that can be cultivated into a bipartisan policy that benefits farmers alike.

The bills, irrespective of any economic merit the government deems them to have, cannot be enacted against the will it seeks to serve. Doing such a thing would fly in the face of everything a democratic government stands for. One must also ask how the government expects farmers to trust these reforms to enable greater growth. The government has a track record with idealistic reform that is shoddily implemented. Simply ask any Indian who waited in line for hours waiting to exchange money after the demonetization in 2016, or the business-owners who struggled to register themselves for the Goods and Service Tax. Both of these reforms stunted the economy, they were gift-wrapped with idealism and promise, but delivered nothing. How can farmers expect anything different from the implementation of these bills?

Now, the government finds itself in a lose-lose position. If the bill is repealed, the government has successfully tabooed these reforms; no future government will subsume the contents of the bill into their manifestos or agendas and they will be forgotten. If the bill is enacted, the reforms will be taken to the courts and used as a stick to beat the BJP during election season. What we must take from our farmers and remind ourselves as Indians is this: The government, even if it is not formed by parties we ally ourselves with, can be held accountable.