The relevance of the notion of national identity for political stability is on the rise. Despite the complexity and relative ambiguity of this concept, it has a value that cannot be omitted in explaining intergroup relations, sociopolitical conflict and continuity of political systems. With recent news of Kurdish referenda, rising sectarian divisions, increasing rifts between certain Arab states and growing rivalries over regional hegemonies by non-Arab actors, what is left of Arab political identity?

Traditional institutions that have historically played major roles in shaping Arab identities are on the decline. Those that have replaced them often take a less tolerant and benevolent stance. Such developments beg the question, how was Arab identity ever defined, expressed or institutionalized? Looking back at, and forward to, the course of Arab culture in recent times can help us identify and better understand the region’s core issues and future trajectory.

Many trace the roots of several current crises in the Middle East and the Arab world to the reality of state formation in the Middle East and the legitimacy of borders delineated by former colonial powers. In identifying themselves as Arabs, most individuals in the region take pride in highlighting their unique identity. Ironically, however, identity among Arabs is more of a feedback result to external imposition; political psychologists assert that identity, most often, is a reaction to internal and external forces and an array of insecurities. Therefore, these colonial borders, which were not based on any actual ethnic or geographical premise but rather were drawn for geopolitical gains, are the basis of the so-called Arab identity.

As independence movements pushed out European imperialists, Arabs were finally no longer second-class citizens in their own countries, invigorating a pan-Arabian euphoria of sorts. During the 1950’s, this particular sensation pushed the political pan-Arab identity to center stage, with more socialist sentiments from parties such as the Ba’ath Movement and anti-colonial and anti-Zionist movements that defined the Arab identity in ethno-cultural terms of inclusion rather than racial segregation. However, plans to institutionalize this vigor fell short of their goal once put into practice. The failure of the United Arab Republic between Egypt and Syria was a reality check. The feeble performance of the Arab armies in the various Arab-Israeli wars and the inter-regional power conflicts between the UAR leaders from both Syria and Egypt were the two main drivers of its failure. This ethno-cultural inclusion within the larger identifier of an Arab political identity, however righteous it seemed, was a tool for political power. When it seemed convenient, the Arab card was played. When not, the identity was silenced. This process only exacerbated what scholars now call the Arab identity crisis.

Recently, the "dashed expectations" following the 2011 Arab Spring, "civil wars" in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen, as well as "backwardness" and "religious fanaticism" are buzzwords used by international media — not erroneously — to outline the situation in broad enclaves of the Arab world. However, what is more fascinating is how in the background there is always some idealistic opinion, with whatever political change, that envisions a pan-Arab unification as a legitimate goal. Evidently, however, these seemingly ever-present opinions still face the same challenges they did in Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arabism of the 1950s: ethnic identity. If Arabs are to come together, they will first have to agree on who is considered Arab and who is not.

National identity is even more problematic than attempting to preconceive an all-encompassing Arab one. More than three quarters of a century after the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, states that emerged from it have yet to define, project and maintain a national identity that is both inclusive and representative. It is important to note that none of the countries of the Middle East are homogeneous — they consist of numerous ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic minorities. However, that is not due to ethnic diversity, but rather it is because this narrow exclusive national identity cannot not be imposed from above as it has previously been. Specifically, the European model of territory-based national identity, whether borrowed or enforced, has proven to be unsuccessful when implemented in the Middle East.

The trajectory of state formation in the European model starts with a nation that turns into a state. The supranationalism of Europe today is the culmination of a process whereby states that have fully realized their individual national identities have opted to voluntarily surrender parts of that distinct identity and seek a common European one. This process has been reversed in the Middle East, where states are still in search of a nation. In that process, Arab states have tried numerous alternative means to circumvent the problem of national identity. They went into unmapped terrain. When deemed convenient by state leaders and foreign actors, the pan-Arab and pan-Islamic identities were a substitute for individual national identities. Unable to transform states into nations, Arab states opted for trans-state regional identities. They sought to overcome the difficulties of evolving a territory-based national identity by focusing on the common cultural and religious background, emphasizing certain aspects for certain reasons. This process of cherry-picking identities created a paradox within these states regarding their territory-based identity and national interests. This inability to define Arabness in a political sense translated to illegitimacy issues within these colonial borders of the region, and hence the modern Middle East as a whole.

Today, the challenge does not lie in excluding or including certain ethnicities. It is important to remember that while the Arab and Muslim world was unified for very short periods, it has almost always been united culturally and economically. Therefore, the challenge is to forge our legacy and identity by embracing Arab diversity and creating strategies that celebrate it. Without exception, all Middle Eastern states have made futile top-down bids at forging this identity. Whether ideological, religious, dynastical or power-centric, these attempts consistently failed and have often resulted in rifts and sectarian tensions. Is it not time to forge identities from the bottom up?