Whatever the final outcome, the recent Iraqi Kurdish referendum will go down in history for being the first of its kind since the formation of the modern Middle East. After years of internal power struggles, coupled with a nationalist sentiment for independence irreconcilable with a gross unpreparedness for such freedom, Iraqi Kurds have taken a monumental step forward on their long-paved pathway to independence. The legacy of this watershed moment in Iraqi Kurdish history, however, does not go unmarred by international backlash and practical challenges.

On Sept. 25, Iraqi Kurds, who occupy the four provinces of Kirkuk, Sinjar, Khanaqin and Makhmour claimed and controlled by the Kurdish Regional Government turned out to vote on arguably one of the most contentious issues in modern Iraqi history: Kurdish independence. Very cognizant of the fact that a referendum outcome would not mean immediate independence, the KRG seeks to use the landslide nine-to-one result as a bargaining chip with Baghdad, which remains vehemently opposed to an independent Kurdistan. Those in the driver’s seat in Baghdad are not the only ones standing in the way. Albeit for different reasons, Iran, Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom all remain opposed to the Kurdish independence.

Without international backing, a successful move to independence seems unlikely. The U.S. and the U.K. have refused to support the Kurdish referendum, prioritizing instead the protection of Iraq’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Both countries share the concern that an internal fracture in Iraq could potentially destabilize a country that is barely standing on four legs. They also both see the integral role that the Kurdish region plays in the U.S.-led coalition against ISIS. Changes of the kind and magnitude that come with secession could compromise the coalition’s forward momentum, most significantly marked by the liberation of Mosul, ISIS’s de-facto capital in Iraq, in July. The U.S. would support an independent Kurdistan, contingent upon how productive it is. A Kurdistan that destabilizes the region is unlikely to fill this brief.

Iran and Turkey share similar concerns regarding the fear that the independence move may throw the whole Middle East into flux. Iran has openly expressed its opposition citing two additional reasons: firstly, the precedent such a regional change may set for other Kurdish populations in the region, including Iran, and secondly the opening that it leaves for its major regional opponent, Israel, to begin meddling in a country too close for comfort. Iran has not taken the matter lightly — it has already taken action by closing Iranian airspace access to the Iraqi Kurdistan region. Such responses further chip away at Kurdistan’s chances at successful independence. Turkey, fearful of the onset of separatist movements by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, also known as the PKK, which has posed a national security threat to Turkey for decades, has threatened to restrict oil trading. Heavily dependent on revenues from crude oil sales from its oil sources, especially fields in Kirkuk, the KRG would take a beating from oil sanctions by Erdogan’s government. More than Baghdad, Ankara can do the most economic damage to Kurdistan.

Internally, there are also several practical issues that would deal significant blows to the effective functioning of an independent Kurdistan. Firstly, a functioning economy will be difficult to create. The Kurds cannot rely solely on oil, water and international aid to keep their economy afloat. Moreover, there are a plethora of problematic logistical issues that impede rudimentary economic progress like corruption, the absence of financial infrastructure, the lack of management experience and the lack of substantive procedural legal traditions.

Secondly, an independent Kurdistan faces military complications which are worrisome considering the geopolitical space it would be entering as a new country. As effective in combat as the Peshmerga forces are, they are not exactly an established, ready military. Creating a Kurdish defense force would require incorporating autonomous guerrilla units into a professional, unified force, which would be temporally challenging. There is also the question of who would help fund the Kurdish air force and train its troops, considering that Turkey recently halted training for the Peshmerga.

No secessionist movements in history have succeeded without colossal challenges. While many Kurds see this referendum as a beacon of hope in their endeavor for independence, the legacy of this vote will undoubtedly be underpinned by Kurdistan’s struggle to overcome logistical challenges and navigate its way in the international arena among hostile players.